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Instability and Change in Collective Bargaining: An Analysis of the Effects of Changing 
Institutional Structures 
 
Abstract: Previous studies on collective bargaining structures and macro-economic 
performance have largely ignored the role of the stable and instable institutional structures 
and the effects of institutional change itself. In this paper we posit that institutional stability 
of collective bargaining is of major importance for the moderation of unit labour costs 
growth. This hypothesis is tested on the basis of data which covers the period 1965 to 2012 
and includes 28 countries. The results show that institutional change impairs the capacity to 
moderate unit labour cost growth significantly in the subsequent years following the change. 
This effect also holds for changes in both decentralization and centralization of institutions.  
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Instability and Change in Collective Bargaining: An Analysis of the Effects of Changing 
Institutional Structures 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article takes up a classical theme in economic and social sciences – the consequences of 
institutional change – by analysing the impact of changes to institutional structures of 
collective bargaining and the subsequent institutional instability on macro-economic 
performance. Changes to collective bargaining structures, i.e. in the level, domain and form 
of bargaining coordination among different actors, have been pervasive across industrialized 
countries in recent decades, not least since the advent of the current economic crisis, where in 
many European countries the institutional structures of collective bargaining have been 
changed on the basis of recommendations from the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the so called ‘Troika’ or ‘creditor 
institutions’ (Marginson 2015). However, the effects of these and other changes in collective 
bargaining structures on macro-economic performance are unclear. In part, this is due to the 
fact that the effects of institutional change by itself and the effects of institutional instability 
have largely been neglected in existing theoretical and empirical studies. 
So far, the macro-level studies of the relationship between have attempted to assess the 
impact of particular bargaining structures on various outcome variables such as wages, 
(un)employment, inflation, (wage) inequality, and in particular on (unit) labour costs (e.g. 
Baccaro and Simoni 2010; Brandl 2012; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Iversen 1998; Johnston 
2016; Kenworthy 2006; Soskice 1990). Other studies have focused on the change or 
resilience of institutions for collective bargaining facing changing socio-economic and 
technological conditions (e.g. Crouch 1993; Hall and Soskice 2001; Kochan et al. 1994; 
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Streeck 2009; Thelen 2014). The axis of contention in the former – often based on cross-
sectional variance – has thus been which institutional structures performed relatively better in 
terms of particular macro-economic goals, while the axis of the latter has been the existence, 
direction and causes of institutional change.  
Somewhere in between the two, the issue of the macro-economic effects of institutional 
change itself has thus been largely ignored or assumed. For the former strand of studies, this 
omission is probably because after decades of theoretical and empirical debates there is still 
no widely agreed consensus on which institutional structure is associated with the 
comparatively ‘best’ performance (e.g. Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014), so that the focus on 
analysing the effects of the structure itself are still challenging and required. For the latter, the 
cost of change has been theoretically assumed by many scholars seeing path-dependence in 
bargaining structures (Hall and Soskice 2001) or, alternatively, it is the direction and causes 
of change – rather than the effects themselves – that receive attention (e.g. Howell and Givan 
2011; Streeck 2009; Thelen 2014). 
In this article we explain and argue that, in some countries, collective bargaining structures 
have changed considerably over time and these changes have come with non-negligible 
macro-economic costs, at least in the short-to-medium term, i.e. in the few years after the 
change. Building on institutional economics, path dependency theory (e.g. Hall and Soskice 
2001; North 1991; Pierson 2004) and theories of collective bargaining (e.g. Baccaro and 
Simoni, 2010; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Hicks 1932; Knight 1992; Olson 1982; Traxler 
and Brandl 2012), we argue that institutional change and instability is costly due to a reduced 
ability for collective action under increased distributional power struggles between actors. 
Yet contrary to path dependency arguments, we actually observe frequent and significant 
changes to collective bargaining structures. While this seems to question the path 
dependency-logic in conventional neo-institutionalism, our analysis shows that the central 
 5 
argument that change is costly holds, but that this has not prevented actors from changing 
institutions. There are studies which analyse the effects of an institutional change by 
comparing the effects of the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ institutional structure in specific countries 
(e.g. Daouli et al. 2013; Granqvist and Regnér 2008). These studies are focussed on single 
country studies and therefore do not permit generalization on the effects of institutional 
structures themselves and the possible ‘transaction costs’ of the institutional change itself. In 
contrast to these studies, this work differentiates explicitly between the effect of the old and 
new institutional structures and separates the effect of the change itself in a longitudinal and 
comparative cross-country methodological framework, i.e. a macro-theoretical framework. 
Moreover, this framework allows us to investigate the effects of the costs and benefits of 
institutional stability and instability of collective bargaining. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the theoretical expectation 
that institutional change and stability reduce distributional power struggles between actors by 
creating mutual expectations about bargaining behaviour across and within bargaining areas. 
Mutual expectations, in turn, form the basis for wage moderation which is reflected in unit 
labour costs (ULC) growth. Then, we investigate and define the proposed relationship 
between institutional change and instability on nominal and real ULC theoretically and 
empirically in detail. We then present the modelling strategy and test the relationship using a 
distributed lag model regression analysis on the basis of yearly data from 1965 to 2012 of 28 
industrialized countries. In the final section we conclude with the main findings of the 
analysis and discuss the implications of our findings for recent institutional reforms and 
institution building attempts. 
 
2. Changing collective bargaining structures and wage moderation  
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In political and academic debates, the importance of ‘stable’ bargaining institutions is often 
seen as beneficial for the processes and outcomes of collective bargaining (e.g. Fashoyin 
2004). Since the effects of stable or unstable collective bargaining institutions have never 
been investigated directly, the purpose of this article is to investigate what happens to 
performance when bargaining shifts from one institutional structure to another, i.e. when 
institutions change, as well as what the effects of stable and unstable institutional are. We do 
not propose to assess which institutional structure of collective bargaining is superior 
compared to others.  
We posit that both the transition from one institutional structure to another and institutional 
instability – a sequence of institutional changes – entail higher ULC in the short-to-medium 
term. We concentrate on the institutional structure of collective bargaining, considering 
collective bargaining structures as one component of the institutional framework which exists 
in an economy. In our country comparative macro-analytical analysis, we observe macro-
aggregates and concepts and the potential micro-mechanisms at play. Implicit assumptions 
about linkages between micro and macro are, however, needed to warrant our expectation 
about macro-level costs from institutional change and instability. In the following, we present 
three theoretical accounts to warrant our expectation.  
The first account is based on transaction costs stemming from changes of institutional 
structures. While this argument is generally applicable to institutional change and instability 
it is too general for our analysis and needs further elaborations. For this reason, we propose a 
second, account according to which costs arise from distributional struggles that hamper 
collective action on wage moderation in collective bargaining. The third account argues that 
costs arise from conflicts when new bargaining parties’ miscalculate each other’s costs and 
benefits of a settlement. In general, we argue that institutional change and instability lead to 
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loss of information about the (potential) actions of other parties which in different ways 
renders exchanges between actors problematic and costly.     
We focus on the institutional structures of collective bargaining and depart from the standard 
definition of North (1991: 97) that “institutions are humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interactions”. Since we are specifically interested in 
institutions of collective bargaining, we consider distinct procedural constraints which are 
shared among actors and define the process of bargaining as well as the connection between 
bargaining areas and levels together with sanctions for defection. In the words of Knight 
(1992: 17), institutions provide “…two types of information: (1) the nature of sanctions for 
noncompliance and (2) the probable future actions of others”. Additionally, (3) institutions 
define who is bargaining on behalf of whom. Pierson (2004) argues that there is a lock-in 
effect of institutions on agency because creating institutions entail large fixed costs, learning 
effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations. New bargaining structures require that 
new actors are given new roles and responsibilities which have high initial costs before the 
new institution ‘works’ in practice.  
In our first account, and building on Pierson (2004), transaction costs arise when institutions 
no longer provide mutual expectations about behaviour and these costs will often deter actors 
from changing the institutions altogether. However, when institutions are altered, changes 
and instability in collective bargaining structures should entail at least temporary increased 
transaction costs per exchange in labour markets. Zagelmeyer (2005) summarises how 
collective bargaining can reduce transaction costs per exchange in a number of ways: 
standardization of the terms and conditions of employment, providing a system of collective 
regulation for an internal labour market, supplementing incomplete individual labour 
contracts, or reducing uncertainty by providing for stable terms and conditions over the 
period of duration of a collective agreement. This is, of course, not the same as arguing that 
 8 
all collective agreements are efficient. But it stresses how exchanges between employers and 
workers are facilitated by the collective agreement and the procedural arrangements for 
monitoring and enforcing it vis-à-vis individual contracts.    
A key function of collective bargaining for employers is precisely that the price of labour is 
known for a foreseeable future which makes efficient personnel planning possible. Workers 
albeit generally more dependent on the exchange, will also hesitate to take work (and work 
hard), if their terms and conditions are uncertain. Indeed, Hicks (1932) wrote about the 
adjustment costs when shocks feed through the labour market and actors are uncertain about 
the price-setting of labour. If uncertainty becomes endemic, e.g. when institutions change 
multiple times in sequence, transaction costs will increase even further. Employers might hire 
at lower wages, but this might damage their future ability to attract good, productive workers. 
This means that complete decentralization might also lead to performance losses. Actors have 
become socialized into one set of institutions, have learnt how they work and have 
expectations about the actions of other actors.  
The transaction cost-account is well-established in the literature and is for example central to 
the variety of capitalism literature (i.e. Hall and Soskice 2001). Nonetheless, it is too general 
for showing how change and instability of institutions lead to higher ULC. To connect this 
explanation with ULC, we need a way in which increasing transaction costs spill over into 
wage increases (at constant or lower productivity increases), decreases in productivity (at 
constant or lower wage decreases) or simultaneously wage increases and productivity 
decreases.  
Our second account is built on the reduced ability for collective action under increased 
distributional power struggles between actors. In the majority of studies of the macro-
economic performance of collective bargaining institutions, the key concern has been how 
different bargaining structures have produced wage developments aligned or even slightly 
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below productivity increases, i.e. that they moderate wages or ULC respectively (e.g. 
Baccaro and Simoni 2010; Calmfors and Driffill 1988). The idea behind wage moderation is 
that it enables companies to maintain or even increase their competitiveness and in the end, 
from a macro-economic perspective, low inflation and high employment are ensured. 
Scholars in this line of research have debated the relationship between specific collective 
bargaining structures and the desired macro-economic outcomes but the jury still seems to be 
out on the issue of wage moderation. What scholars do agree upon is that institutions of 
collective bargaining matter for wage moderation as an alternative to pure market-induced 
wage moderation (e.g. Ibsen 2016). 
As opposed to market-induced wage moderation, wage moderation through collective 
bargaining is very often a public good due to its non-excludability. Olson (1982) argued that 
such public goods entail a risk of free-riding and defection from cooperation on wage 
moderation by opportunistic actors who can benefit from taking out higher wages that affect 
the relative wages and inflation levels of others, i.e. produce externalities. It has been 
convincingly demonstrated that collective action is possible under various conditions and that 
the central analysis of Olson depends on a host of factors including institutions (e.g. Ostrom 
1990) that structure incentives for collective action. In collective bargaining, institutions 
make up the incentive structure for bargaining actors, as the price of defection lies in formal 
or informal power relations between actors. We can expect that actors will prefer to avoid a 
course of action that leads to sanctions, even if they would have preferred this course of 
action.  
Echoing Knight (1992), recent research on the coordination of bargaining across industries 
and bargaining levels underscores the importance of power relations (Ibsen 2015; Traxler et 
al. 2008). In most bargaining structures, three main power relationships between actors in 
different areas and levels exist (Traxler and Brandl 2012). The ability to produce collective 
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goods and avoid non-trivial defection and free-riding depends upon these power relations. 
First, there is a power relationship between the two sides in the employment relationship, i.e. 
between employers and workers/unions within each bargaining unit. Second, there is a power 
relationship horizontally, i.e. across bargaining units at the same level. Third, a power 
relationship exists vertically between the bargaining units at different levels – ranging from 
single-employer, multi-employer to cross-sectoral bargaining structures. The rules and norms 
governing the interaction between actors in these three relationships can be very diverse in 
different institutional structures – all associated with differences in the ability of actors to 
take collective action. 
Changes to collective bargaining structures imply a re-ordering of either vertical or horizontal 
power relations or of both dimensions simultaneously. Hereby, bargaining actors are re-
ordered or substituted at different levels, domains and units which alters power relations and 
even changes the set of actors bargaining. In the short-to-medium term altered power 
relations can have two consequences: (i) They make sanctioning ambiguous (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005), and (ii) actors need to learn the new sanctions (Pierson 2004). It follows from 
the second point, that even when sanctions are very clear, they still have to be internalized or 
learned by actors which takes time. Ambiguity and learning time undermines Knight’s 
second information function of institutions, i.e. what the probable future actions of others are. 
The consequence of this shift is that actors will focus more intensely on distributive concerns 
rather than integrative concerns which can undermine collective action (Knight 1992; Walton 
and McKersie 1965).  
Horizontally across industries, institutional change might disrupt sanctions of sheltered 
sectors that fail to moderate wages in accordance with the exposed sector (Traxler and Brandl 
2012). Workers are concerned about relative earnings (Elster 1989) which spurs unions in 
other industries to take out higher wages. This move creates a wage-inflation spiral, with 
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other unions making compensatory claims. Moreover, wage increases in one industry 
produce increased costs for other industries. These dynamics are especially pertinent in the 
relationship between sectors exposed to international competition, e.g. manufacturing, and 
sheltered sectors, e.g. public sector and construction. Vertically, a change in bargaining 
institutions might also produce ambiguity about what to expect of bargaining at other levels, 
which in turn spurs a breakdown of the ‘division of labour’ between bargaining levels. This is 
likely both in processes of decentralization where more bargaining autonomy is delegated to 
the company level or vice-versa under centralization, when lower level actors continue to 
bargain for wage increases on top of centrally determined increases. Indeed, complete 
decentralization to spot-market exchanges could produce considerable wage hikes for high-
to-medium skill workers, the wages of which were previously capped by collective 
agreements. By multiplying bargaining loci, wage drift is a likely consequence as higher level 
agreements are supplemented with additional increases at lower levels.       
Finally, the third account is built on bargaining parties’ miscalculations of each other’s costs 
and benefits of a settlement vis à vis engaging and prolonging in industrial action. As Hicks 
stated in his theory of strikes (1932: 146-7): “… the majority of actual strikes are doubtless 
the result of faulty negotiation. . . Any means which enable either side to appreciate better the 
position of the other will always make a settlement easier; adequate knowledge will always 
make a settlement possible”. While the notion of fully informed actors has been challenged in 
a number of ways, it suffices here to say that when bargaining institutions change, it is more 
likely that the new bargaining parties with limited information will make miscalculations 
about the costs and benefits of a settlement for each other. For example, when the bargaining 
level changes, new actors will come together that have not bargained with each other before 
and the risk of miscalculations increases. New employer negotiators might not be aware of 
the strike funds available for trade unions or how ‘valuable’ the wage increase really is for 
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workers. New union negotiators might not be aware of the ability of firms to pay the wage 
demand and they might not be aware of the conflict support provided by employer 
associations. Conversely, stable bargaining relationships are characterized by information 
sharing about the state of the company, industry or the economy at large precisely to avoid 
these miscalculations. See for example Ibsen (2016) on the Swedish and Danish bargaining 
systems.  
Moreover, new bargaining actors will often want to prove themselves to their constituencies 
putting even more pressure on negotiations. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) on the one hand 
argued that the rank-and-file in unions often had higher wage demands than their leaders. 
Baccaro and Simoni (2010) on the other hand argued that the rank-and-file were more attuned 
to the realities on the shop floor and preferred wage moderation. While these positions are 
contradictory to a certain extent, both positions point to how institutional change and 
instability affect the efficacy of intra-organisational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965). 
This is because the expectations between a new leadership and the rank-and-file are likely to 
be misaligned. Thus, in both accounts, new bargaining parties make intra-organisational 
bargaining even harder, which increases the likelihood of miscalculations in inter-
organisational bargaining. Miscalculations increase the likelihood of costly conflicts, e.g. 
strikes and lockouts, leading to deterioration of ULC developments. During centralization, on 
the one hand, a new lead negotiator might even go further than the rank-and-file to prove 
strength. During decentralization, on the other hand, the loci of potential miscalculations 
multiply as often inexperienced, local negotiators take over. Until the negotiators learn from 
experience, get to know their constituencies, and start making more accurate assessments of 
each other, the risk of conflicts increases. Institutional instability will only exacerbate these 
problems of miscalculation, since the information effects of institutions are permanently in 
flux.     
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The bottom line of the second and third account is that institutional change and instability 
will come with costs. In the second account, we propose that horizontal and vertical 
distributional struggles in connection with institutional change and instability lead to reduced 
capability for collective action as illustrated in Figure 1a and 1b. In the third account, we 
propose that institutional change and instability comes with new bargaining parties 
negotiating for new constituencies. Before learning from experience, these new parties 
miscalculate the costs and benefits of a settlement to each other leading to more costly 
conflicts as illustrated in Figure 1c. 
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
For policy making, i.e. for any institution building attempt, this implies that institutional 
change can be expected to have a short-to-medium term (net) negative effect on wage-
moderation performance. Independent of the magnitude and duration of the effect, it can also 
be assumed that the more changes, the more costs accumulate. Consequently, institutional 
instability – that is, multiple changes in sequence – is therefore associated with cumulative 
negative effects.  
As these negative effects are expected to be of a temporary nature, any institutional change 
might, however, still lead to an improved performance in the long run. When actors adjust to 
a new institution, this negative effect of the change might be overcompensated for by the 
effect of the new institutional structure so that in the long term the net effect might be 
positive. It is thus in the interim period between two institutional points (which is when the 
new ‘logic of action’ has fully established itself) that we expect a ubiquitous negative effect. 
The empirical question, however, is how costly and how long it takes to fully restore the 
efficacy of the new institutional structure. The effect most likely varies across time and space 
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as some bargaining systems adapt more quickly than others. In this analysis, however, we are 
trying to arrive at the general effects of change and instability of bargaining structures, rather 
than specific dynamics in particular settings.  
        
3. Institutional change and instability over time: data and operationalization 
 
In order to analyse the effects of institutional change and instability we use a data set which 
covers 28 countries and spans a period from 1965 to 2012. This large sample enables us to 
cover countries with collective bargaining taking place traditionally at decentralised levels 
with uncoordinated interactions between different collective bargaining units such as, for 
example, in the UK and the US, as well as countries with very centralized and coordinated 
institutional structures of collective bargaining as, for example, in the Nordic countries. In 
addition, the sample covers countries in which collective bargaining structures evolved 
‘historically’ over a long period of time as well as countries with institutional structures 
which were set up in a relatively short period of time as, for example, in many Central and 
Eastern European countries. Furthermore the sample includes countries of very different 
sizes, geographical locations, socio-political and economic environments in order to provide 
a comprehensive picture of the industrialized world for which we aim to generalize the 
results. In fact the sample covers all countries of well-known typologies, e.g. varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), welfare typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990) and 
industrial relations and employment regimes (Crouch 1993). The sample, moreover, covers 
institutional changes in various directions: changes towards higher levels and more 
coordinated forms of collective bargaining and those towards lower levels and more 
uncoordinated institutional structures. As regards the context of collective bargaining, the 
long time period has the advantage that it covers different phases in the economic 
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development of countries and their business cycles. See Table 1 which includes a full list of 
the countries and relevant descriptive statistics.  
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
In the following analysis we test the effect of an institutional change and of institutional 
instability on changes in nominal unit labour costs (NULC) and real unit labour costs 
(RULC) which express the relationship between actual compensation per employee and real 
labour productivity (for NULC) and nominal productivity (for RULC). Both measures are 
frequently used as an indicator of competitiveness. In the following analysis we will 
concentrate more on NULC as it is a more direct indicator of collective bargaining outcomes 
and has a higher salience in political debates about collective bargaining reforms as seen in 
the macro-economic imbalance procedure scoreboard in the EU (e.g. Aumayr-Pintar et al. 
2014; Marginson 2015). If results or concepts hold for NULC and RULC we will refer in 
discussions to ULC in general.  
We are interested in the effects of change and instability of institutional structures of 
collective bargaining and not primarily in the effects of the different institutional structures 
themselves. Thus the focal explanatory variable in this study is a measure of institutional 
change and instability. We base our main measure on the basis of changes in the 
categorization of collective bargaining coordination developed by Kenworthy (2001) and 
provided by Visser (2015), i.e. on variable ‘coordination structure’. The categorization is 
based on variations in the level at which collective bargaining takes place, the actors involved 
and the extent of coordination between actors within a particular institutional framework. 
Thus this measure captures within its categories both the horizontal and vertical relationships 
between bargaining units. The categories are: (i) company wide and uncoordinated 
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bargaining; (ii) company wide but weakly coordinated bargaining; (iii) industry wide but 
uncoordinated bargaining; (iv) industry wide and coordinated bargaining; (v) economy wide 
bargaining. Although both horizontal and vertical relations are basically captured by this 
measure we use and test a second variable which classifies collective bargaining institutions 
on the basis of the predominant level at which bargaining takes place. The data for this 
variable, i.e. bargaining level, is also provided by Visser (2015) which classifies five different 
levels at which collective bargaining takes place predominantly: on (i) local/company level; 
(ii) sectoral/industry level with additional local/company level bargaining; (iii) 
sectoral/industry level; (iv) national/central level with additional sector/industry level 
bargaining; and (v) national/central level.  
Both measures of institutional structures of collective bargaining and thus of institutional 
change aim to categorize and describe different institutional structures on the basis of 
different criteria and concepts. However, both concepts are not independent of each other 
since they describe and categorize similar institutional structures. We will concentrate our 
analysis and discussion on variable coordination structure as it captures relevant institutional 
changes in a more fine-grained way compared to variable bargaining level but looking also 
on the level variable allows us to test the robustness of our analyses on the basis of two 
concepts both of which have advantages and disadvantages.   
However, for both measures, any change from one category to another in one year to another 
implies that different actors, on different levels and with different relationships, are involved 
in collective bargaining. Consequently, we define and operationalize our measure of 
institutional change as a change from one category to another in a country from t0 to t1 as one 
change (numerically expressed by 1). We moreover, hypothesize that neither the direction of 
change nor the specific category to which the structure is changed is important in having an 
effect on the efficacy. What matters for the change and instability variable is that the 
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institutional structures have changed. Needless to say, the new institutional structure has a 
different effect on ULC than the old structure. However, this effect from the institutional 
structure itself is different to the effect of the change itself and thus we separate both effects. 
Nonetheless, neglecting the direction of change is controversial we explicitly test the effect of 
changes in different directions separately; we are not expecting any differences.  
We construct two focal kinds of variables to measure the distinct effect of a change in the 
institutional structure of collective bargaining as well as for the resulting institutional 
instability. Variable change captures institutional changes simply by indicating that in a 
specific year a change in the institutional structure occurred, whereas the instability variable 
adds a magnitude dimension to (repeated) institutional change. The variable change also 
measures and expresses the frequency of institutional change. However, according to our 
theoretical considerations, we expect that an institutional change affects the efficacy of 
collective bargaining not only in the year of the change itself but also in subsequent years. 
Thus we expect that an institutional change casts a shadow of the past in subsequent years. 
We also expect that this effect weakens over time. However, there are no theoretical or 
empirical evidences available regarding the number of subsequent years in which an effect 
can be expected. Therefore we consider and test in our analysis alternative operationalisations 
of any effects in subsequent years, i.e. of different functional forms of a shadow of the past 
which an institutional change is likely to have. We concentrate in the following on two 
versions. In the first we suppose that the efficacy of collective bargaining is gradually 
restored two years after the institutional change. Thus the instability variable is defined by 
considering the impact of institutional change by 1 in the year the change occurred (t0=1) and 
in the following two years. But, in the following year (t1) the effect of the change is expected 
to be weaker. The weaker effect is numerically expressed and measured by 0.8 (t1=0.8). In 
the second year after the change, the effect shrinks to 0.4 (t2=0.4). In the third year after the 
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institutional change, there is no effect (t3=0). Restoring the institutional functioning in two 
years is, however, an optimistic perspective on the effect of institutional change on collective 
bargaining. Therefore, in a second version we assume that the restoration of the efficacy takes 
longer, i.e. there is a four year shadow of the past and the effect declines at a constant rate 
over the four year period after the institutional change: t0=1, t1=0.8, t2=0.6, t3=0.4, t4=0.2, 
t5=0. We denote the variables with a shadow of the past of two years by instability(t+2) and 
with a shadow of the past of four years instability(t+4). In the analysis, we also estimate and 
test various functional forms (linear and nonlinear functions) of a shadow of the past. In 
Figure 2 the operationalization and respective gradual decline of the effect is illustrated.  
 
- Figure 2 about here - 
 
If the institutional structure changed repeatedly over time and if the restoration of the 
functioning of the new institutional structures takes time, a ‘simple’ frequency measure 
underestimates the impact of institutional change on the efficacy of collective bargaining over 
a long period of time (e.g. Campos and Nugent 2002). The variable instability captures the 
magnitude of institutional instability caused by a series of changes. If the institutional 
structure is changed repeatedly, the instability variables might lead to a relatively high 
variance over time and capture the magnitude of institutional stability better than the change 
variable can do.  
 
Institutional change and economic performance: What causes what? 
 
In Table 1 the number of changes to the institutional structure of collective bargaining for 
both variables, i.e. coordination structure and bargaining level, is shown for each of the 
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countries under consideration. Table 1 shows the absolute number of changes since data is 
available and in percentages, i.e. weighted by the number of years for which data is available. 
A correlation analysis shows that there is a significant correlation of more than 60 percent 
between change in variables coordination structure and bargaining level which confirms that 
both categorizations of institutional structures do express similar concepts.  
There is also a significant correlation of more than 45 percent between the frequency of 
institutional change and the average yearly change of NULC and RULC. This means that the 
more institutional changes, the higher average changes in ULC. However, if different 
institutional structures of collective bargaining result are associated with different ULC, it is 
also reasonable to argue that changes in the institutional structure of collective bargaining are 
motivated by the need to improve the competitiveness of countries, i.e. the institutional 
structure of collective bargaining is changed with the expectation that the new structure 
dampens ULC growth. Methodologically this raises concerns about reverse causality. As both 
causal directions are reasonable we address this issue of reverse causality explicitly and in 
various ways.  
We started to investigate the issue of the direction of causality by applying a Granger 
causality test (Granger 1969) which provides empirical evidence of whether the causality is 
two-directional or uni-directional. The detailed test results are available upon request. 
Various tests on NULC and RULC with different time lags ranging from 2 to 10 years were 
undertaken. The investigation of different lag lengths allowed us to derive robust conclusions 
as regards the direction of causation between ULC on the one hand and on the other, 
institutional change and instability expressed of either the coordination structure or the 
bargaining level. 
All the tests did not allow us to draw fully consistent conclusions about the direction of 
causation, as significant estimates were found only for the coordination structure on the basis 
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of variable change with a lag of 2 years and for both instability variables at a lag length of 6 
and 8 years. For change and instability in the bargaining level no significant test results were 
found. The bottom line of all the tests is that there is some empirical support for the 
hypothesis that institutional change causes a change in ULC, while there is no significant 
estimate at all for a relationship in the other direction, i.e. that a change in ULC causes 
institutional change. Although this result is not fully conclusive on the direction of causation, 
it supports the hypothesis that the causality runs only one-way from institutional 
change/instability to a change in ULC and not the other way!  
This result does not rule out the possibility that the explicit intention behind some of the 
reforms, i.e. changes in the collective bargaining structure, are directly motivated by  policy 
makers’ wish to dampen the growth of ULC in the country. The test results show, however, 
that the number of such reforms is either relatively small and/or not systematically 
undertaken in times with high growth rates of ULC.  
 
4. Modelling and empirical strategy and empirical results 
 
In order to test our hypotheses we apply an econometric analysis of the relationship between 
institutional change and instability with ULC. For the empirical tests we have to address 
some estimation challenges that arise from the dynamic panel structure of our data. In 
particular we have to consider the modelling constraint that the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable in the model specification leads to inconsistent and biased estimates. For 
this reason we use a distributed lag modelling approach which is suggested to be appropriate 
for our data structure, i.e. a panel of 28 countries with an unbalanced time dimension of up to 
around 40 years (e.g. Kiviet 1995). Even though the results from the Granger tests suggest 
that it is more likely that the effect runs from institutional change to a change in ULC and not 
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the other way, we will control for a possible endogeneity in our model by using an 
instrumental variable approach. In particular we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
generalized method of moments (GMM) approach in which we include all the explanatory 
variables lagged by one period and the twice-lagged dependent variable for the regular 
instruments (as suggested by Arellano 1989).  
In the tested specifications, the logarithmic yearly changes of ULC are modelled as a linear 
function of lagged independent variables. Our focal independent variables are the variables 
instability(t+2), instability(t+4), and change based alternatively on variables coordination 
structure and bargaining level, which are all included in separate specifications. In each of the 
specifications, a set of control variables are also used. In the following analysis we show and 
report the results of a parsimonious specification which includes the ‘key’ determinants of the 
development of ULC identified in previous studies (e.g. Ark et al. 2005): (logarithmic yearly) 
GDP growth (i.e. economic growth), inflation and the unemployment rate. In addition to this 
we also include collective bargaining coverage to control for the share of employees who fall 
under a collective agreement relative to the total number of employees in the country. As we 
expect that the new coordination structure and level of collective bargaining have an effect on 
ULC themselves, we control for this effect by including either variable coordination structure 
and bargaining level in the specification. In order to control for any period and country 
specific effects, a full set of country-section fixed (first differences) and period fixed (dummy 
variables) effects are included. Various robustness tests were applied to this specification 
including a larger set of control variables for the economic situation as well as other 
industrial relations variables. These robustness tests confirm the results of the parsimonious 
specification.  
In order to reduce the number of parameters in the distributed lag model, we restrict the 
number of lagged values to five, and use a polynominal distributed lag to impose a 
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smoothness condition on the lag coefficients. We are using a so called ‘Almon lag’ because it 
has the advantage that numerical problems that arise from collinearity, which is a problem of 
the distributed lag approach per se, can be avoided (e.g. McDowell 2004). In the following 
analysis, we show the estimation results for all non-categorical variables which all start 
entering the specification with a lag of t-1. For details on the estimation see Brückner (2012). 
Both the lag length and the degree of the polynominal are tested on their robustness and 
confirm the results. The results of the above empirical strategy are shown in Table 2 for 
institutional change in the coordination of collective bargaining, in Table 3 for institutional 
change in the level of collective bargaining, and in Table 4 for institutional instability on 
ULC. For our preferred specification, which is on NULC and by considering all changes, we 
report the estimates of each lag and the sum of the distributed lag coefficients (SoC). Given 
that the SoC results are more interesting than the estimates of each individual lag, we report 
the SoC for RULC alone as well as for the analyses of changes towards more/less 
coordination or more decentralised/centralised levels of collective bargaining in Tables 2 and 
3. In Table 4 on institutional stability we concentrate on the SoC estimates only.     
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Table 2 shows the results for all changes, changes only towards a less, and towards a more 
coordinated institutional structure of collective bargaining on both NULC and RULC. As 
regards the estimates of the individual lag effects, it can be seen that for our focal 
independent variable, i.e. change, the sign of the coefficient and the significance of the 
estimates varies over the lags. This is similar for the control variables and is a typical 
symptom of high collinearity among the regressors. However, the summative effect of all the 
lags, which is the more adequate measure for inference (e.g. Brückner 2012), for the change 
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variable shows that institutional change leads to an increase in both NULC and RULC over a 
period of five years after the institutional change. Even though the effect is higher on NULC 
compared to RULC, the effect is very similar in its scale regardless of whether the 
institutional change was towards a more or less coordinated institutional structure, which 
supports our hypothesis on the effect of institutional change. In Table 3 we report the results 
by applying the same estimation and modelling strategy on the same dependent variables but 
use change in the level of collective bargaining as an indicator of institutional change. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
As can be seen, the results in Table 3 mimic the previous results to a large extent. Again, the 
estimates for the individual lags differ for each individual lag but are robust for SoC in 
different versions of the estimation. Most importantly the results clearly show that change in 
the level of collective bargaining induces an increase in both NULC and RULC. Also 
similarly, this increase is observable independent of the direction of change.  
We now turn to the effect of institutional instability, i.e.  the effects of a sequence of changes. 
The results of these tests are presented in Table 4 showing the results for institutional 
instability with a shadow of the past of two and four years for both NULC and RULC. 
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, both versions of the institutional instability variables show a 
significant effect on NULC. As regards RULC, the effect is positive in both versions but only 
significant if we assume that an institutional change comes with a shadow of the past of two 
years. In any case, the results clearly show that the efficacy of collective bargaining is not 
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fully restored after one year. The interpretation of the results in Table 4 is that the higher the 
institutional instability, the higher the growth of ULC, in particular of NULC. This effect 
particularly holds for the version with a shadow of the past of two years, the effect is stronger 
than the ‘simple’ change effects (Table 2 and 3) as well as the effect of instability under the 
assumption of a shadow of the past of four years for NULC. The bottom line is that, first, 
repeated institutional change increases instability and leads to an additional effect in the 
development of ULC, and second, the effect gradually weakens over time. 
The implication of these results is that any ‘long-term’ effects of an institutional change have 
to be balanced against the ‘short term’ effect of the institutional change itself. It is important 
to note that this result holds for different operationalisations of institutional change, i.e. by 
using change in the coordination structure or level of collective bargaining as an indicator. In 
fact, further robustness tests with alternative indicators of change of collective bargaining, 
like for example the Traxler and Brandl (2012) classification, were made which confirm the 
effect. However it is also important to note that the effects of institutional change reported 
and discussed before are an average effect and this does not, of course, imply that the 
magnitude of the effect varies for different institutional structures, as well as for different 
periods and different countries. This average effect certainly  does not rule out that some very 
targeted and well prepared ‘reforms’ of collective bargaining institutions in some countries 
did not cause increases in ULC. Indeed, as tests of the effect in sub-periods of our sample 
showed, there is some evidence that, for example, reforms made in European countries in the 
1990s, i.e. when it was necessary for some countries to bring macroeconomic aggregates in 
line with the Maastricht criteria, the effect on ULC was not significant. On the other hand 
however, this means that in other periods the effect of institutional changes on ULC was even 
higher.     
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However, by looking at the results of both institutional change and instability, the upshot of 
the analyses is that institutional change has a clear effect on the development of ULC. 
Institutional change causes an increase in ULC growth and the more frequently the 
institutional structure is changed, i.e. the greater the institutional instability, the higher the 
ULC growth. Thus institutional change and institutional instability in collective bargaining 
comes with significant ‘costs’.  
 
5. Conclusions and policy perspectives 
 
In this article, we hypothesized that change to collective bargaining institutions is costly 
because it leads to a disruption of the ‘rules of the game’ between the actors involved in 
collective bargaining. It was explained that institutional stability is of focal importance for the 
provision of public goods, such as wage moderation, and for avoiding costly conflicts due to 
miscalculations by bargaining parties. When institutions change, the efficacy of collective 
bargaining suffers until a new institutional order is fully in place which provides information 
about the likely behaviour of other actors.  
We tested the effect of change and instability of the institutional structure of collective 
bargaining by focusing both on changes in the coordination structure and the level of 
collective bargaining on unit labour costs development. The findings show that unit labour 
costs tend to increase following institutional change and repeated change, i.e. unstable 
institutional structures are associated with higher growth rates of unit labour costs. Thus 
changes in collective bargaining institutions are costly in achieving the goal of 
competitiveness. The results also show that institutional change towards an institutional 
structure which is associated with a more beneficial economic outcome than the previous one, 
does not necessarily lead to better economic outcomes per se! This is because any overall 
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effect from a ‘better’ performing institutional structure is likely to be dampened by the cost of 
the change itself – at least in the short-to-medium term. 
Future research should try to investigate the micro-mechanisms driving the relationship 
between institutional change and the increases in unit labour costs. This could entail more 
case-oriented research of bargaining processes and how mutual expectations, power and 
miscalculations influence the ability of parties to moderate wages and contain conflicts. In 
any case, the results of our analysis shed new light on the effects of current institutional 
reforms of collective bargaining systems. In particular on current processes of dismantling 
bargaining structures which are often used as a standard recipe for reducing unit labour cost 
growth (e.g. Marginson 2015). This point leads us to the policy implications of our study.    
Specifically, we want to draw attention to some policy maker’s ambitions to increase the 
competitiveness of some countries by reforming the institutional structure of collective 
bargaining. We aim here to contribute another aspect to this discourse. In countries which 
have made bilateral agreements with the ‘Troika’, changes in the institutional structure of 
collective bargaining were demanded and implemented. However, in many countries, these 
reforms were not only accompanied by social unrest and mistrust among actors, as espoused 
by the third account, which in themselves lead to economic ‘inefficiencies’, but the success of 
the reforms is also questionable, as many economic indicators of success have not developed 
as expected (e.g. Jaumotte and Buitron 2015). Our results suggest two shortcomings in the 
reform agenda.   
The first shortcoming has to do with the neglect of the short-to-medium term costs of 
changing institutions. The ‘knowledge-reservoir’ on the effects of different institutional 
structures of collective bargaining has - until now - focused almost entirely on the effects of 
the institutional structures themselves.  Although there is no widely accepted agreement upon 
which institutional structure is associated with the ‘best’ performance, policy makers in 
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different countries reformed ‘their’ national institutions of collective bargaining in order to 
achieve beneficial economic outcomes. While the results reported here do not exclude the 
possibility that the reforms were the correct policies to help these countries recover and 
prosper economically in the long-run, they might explain how the short-to-medium term 
negative effects of change itself have dulled the positive effects of the reform. In fact, if the 
negative short-term effect is stronger than the expected positive effect of reform, the results 
may explain why many negative indicators in these countries even increase.  
The second shortcoming in the reform agenda has to do with relying upon and justifying 
reforms primarily on the basis of unit labour cost considerations. Our empirical analyses 
reject the notion that changes in the collective bargaining institutions are systematically 
caused by the ‘objective’ development of unit labour costs. Of course, this does not exclude 
the possibility that the intention of some changes in the institutional structure of collective 
bargaining, i.e. some reforms in some countries, are in fact based on the commendable goal 
of improving the economic performance of a country by targeting the development of unit 
labour costs. This intention behind the reforms is especially observable in the ‘Troika 
countries’ for which the Memoranda of Understanding explicitly motivates reforms of 
collective bargaining structures with reference to the cost competitiveness of countries 
(Schulten and Müller 2014). Our results rather suggest that the majority of reforms since the 
mid-1960s were motivated by something else, such as for example by ‘neoliberal ideas’. 
Without being able to investigate this further, it appears that the majority of institutional 
changes of collective bargaining structures since the mid-1960s were driven by changing 
power relations and a political-economic Zeitgeist – which produced a higher degree of 
coordination and centralization of collective bargaining in the 1960s and decentralization 
since the 1990s – rather than by objective measures such as unit labour costs. This argument 
is supported by the fact that it is not yet definitively clear for important policy makers which 
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institutional structures of collective bargaining lead to which economic outcomes (e.g. 
Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014; European Commission 2015b). 
In other words, when it comes to the motivation for institutional reforms, the treatment might 
have been chosen before the illness has been diagnosed. Indeed, if we factor in how reforms 
are depressing private consumption in many countries, institutional changes that were 
supposed to increase exports through wage moderation (but were unsuccessful due to the 
reasons we suggest), might have double-negative impacts in wage-led growth economies (e.g. 
Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012).  
In addition, it is likely that in a situation of economic uncertainty and social turbulence, the 
process of institution-rebuilding is more difficult so the negative effect prevails even longer, 
thus delaying any recovery in these countries further (e.g. Rychly 2009). Accordingly, one 
important implication of this study for policy makers is that the timing of institutional 
reforms is crucial. Even if policy makers are sure – if this is possible – that the reform will 
prove to be successful in the long-term, it may be important for them to consider the timing 
of their decision in the short-term. They might have to balance a dilemma between, the 
sooner the reform, the sooner the long term positive effects vs. the situation becoming even 
worse due to the short-to-medium negative effects. Nonetheless, the results of this study 
clearly show that policy-makers should avoid changing collective bargaining institutions very 
often; institutional instability due to a series of changes leads to even higher costs. Our 
analysis thus suggests that well-functioning collective bargaining institutions rest heavily 
upon a stable institutional environment and stable relationships among actors.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
FIGURE 1 
The relationship between institutional change and unit labour cost change 
(a)  Horizontal distributional struggles 
 
(b) Low vertical governability 
 
(c) Increased level of conflict 
 
  
Institutional change 
Ambigious, new 
horizontal power 
relations and 
authority 
Increased risk of 
defection 
Increased 
distributional 
struggles between 
industries,  e.g. 
exposed vs. sheltered 
Increased 
unit labour 
costs 
Institutional change 
Ambigious, new 
vertical power 
relations and 
authority 
Increased risk of 
defection 
Wage-drift 
at different 
levels 
Increased 
unit labour 
costs 
Institutional change 
New bargaining 
parties for new 
constituencies 
 Miscalculations 
of costs and 
benefits of 
settlement 
Increased 
level of 
conflict 
Increased 
unit labour 
costs 
 35 
FIGURE 2 
Illustration of the operationalization of institutional change and instability 
 
 
Note: Black bars illustrate the declining duration of the effect of the change with a shadow of 
the past of four years, i.e. of instability(t+4). Grey bars the effect with a shadow of the past of 
two years, i.e. of instability(t+2).  
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TABLE 1 
Institutional change and instability of collective bargaining 
    (a) Coordination structure  (b) Bargaining level 
Country Since
1
  # changes
2
 % change
3
  # changes
2
 % change
3
 
Australia 1965  6 87 %  3 94 % 
Austria 1965  1 98 %  1 98 % 
Belgium 1965  8 83 %  21 55 % 
Bulgaria 1992  3 84 %  11 45 % 
Canada 1965  2 96 %  0 100 % 
Cyprus 1990  0 100 %  0 100 % 
Denmark 1965  13 72 %  7 85 % 
Finland 1965  18 61 %  38 19 % 
France 1965  4 91 %  0 100 % 
Germany 1965  0 100 %  0 100 % 
Greece 1975  0 100 %  21 43 % 
Hungary 1990  0 100 %  1 95 % 
Ireland 1965  9 80 %  8 83 % 
Italy 1965  5 89 %  6 87 % 
Korea 1965  1 92 %  0 100 % 
Luxembourg 1965  4 91 %  0 100 % 
Malta 1990  0 100 %  0 100 % 
Netherlands 1965  11 76 %  15 68 % 
New Zealand 1965  7 85 %  2 96 % 
Poland 1990  0 100 %  0 100 % 
Portugal 1978  13 61 %  8 76 % 
Slovakia 1990  4 81 %  1 95 % 
Slovenia 1990  4 81 %  10 55 % 
Spain 1977  7 79 %  6 83 % 
Sweden 1965  7 85 %  5 89 % 
Switzerland 1965  1 98 %  0 100 % 
UK 1965  7 85 %  6 87 % 
USA 1965  2 96 %  2 96 % 
Note: 
1 
Shows the year since when data is available. 
2 
Shows how often the structure of 
coordination or the predominant level of collective bargaining was changed. 
3 
Shows in 
percentages in how many years there was no change.  
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TABLE 2 
The effects of institutional change in the coordination of collective bargaining on unit labour costs 
 Nominal unit labour costs (NULC)     Real unit labour costs (RULC) 
 All  
changes 
 Less 
coordination 
More 
coordination 
 All 
changes 
 Less 
coordination 
More  
coordination 
 Distributed Lag Effects SoC  SoC SoC  SoC  SoC SoC 
 Lag (t) Lag (t-1) Lag(t-2) Lag (t-3) Lag (t-4) Lag (t-5) (t to t-5)  (t to t-5) (t to t-5)  (t to t-5)  (t to t-5) (t to t-5) 
Change+ 0.1377*** 0.0028* -0.0018 0.7695*** -0.2093** -0.0003 0.6986**  0.6960** 0.6978**  0.32197***  0.32603*** 0.32458*** 
(3.4068) (0.1694) (-0.0578) (12.4749) (-2.2462) (-0.0022) (2.2431)  (2.228) (2.2400)  (2.6326)  (2.6641) (2.6552) 
Structure+ 0.0542 0.0690*** 0.0376 0.0426 0.0391 0.0595 0.3020***  0.3026*** 0.3012***  0.4082***  0.4153*** 0.4125*** 
(1.3647) (3.8234) (1.1802) (0.7059) (0.4315) (0.4904) (3.6102)  (3.6054) (3.6137)  (3.6498)  (3.7090) (3.6896) 
Bargaining 
coverage 
0.0372 0.0536 0.0410 0.0606 0.0557 0.0195 0.2677***  0.2678*** 0.2677***  0.2119**  0.2091** 0.2109** 
(0.9075) (3.1063) (1.3511) (1.0177) (0.6155) (0.1604) (2.6399)  (2.6342) (2.6381)  (2.1732)  (2.1431) (2.1637) 
Economic 
growth 
0.0398 0.0868*** 0.1014*** 0.0477 0.0720 0.0364 0.3840  0.3839 0.3844  0.1332  0.1499* 0.1435* 
(1.0498) (4.8667) (3.5692) (0.8845) (0.8858) (0.3339) (1.0636)  (1.0527) (1.0661)  (1.5983)  (1.8074) (1.7328) 
Inflation 0.0746* 0.0693*** 0.0662** 0.0667 0.0683 0.1681 0.5131  0.5143 0.5122  0.3144**  0.3205*** 0.3174*** 
(1.8815) (4.2441) (2.2350) (1.1431) (0.7711) (1.4107) (1.0892)  (1.0837) (1.0914)  (2.5917)  (2.6396) (2.6178) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.1421*** 0.0846*** 0.0630*** 0.0819* 0.0422 -0.0052 0.4086  0.4064 0.4083  0.0122  0.0240 0.0199 
(3.6395) (4.7462) (2.6919) (1.7415) (0.5787) (-0.0524) (0.7042)  (0.6989) (0.7063)  (0.1807)  (0.3585) (0.2966) 
N x T:       801  801 801  801  801 801 
S.E.regression:       0.0670  0.0670 0.0670  0.0239  0.0239 0.0239 
Note: + Variables structure and change refer to the coordination of collective bargaining. Less coordination considers only changes towards institutional structures 
with less coordination (decentralization); More coordination changes towards more coordination (centralization); All changes considers both directions of change. 
SoC = Sum of the distributed lag Coefficients. In all specifications a full set of period and country fixed effects dummies is included. Panel Generalized Method 
of Moments. First difference transformation. Panel corrected covariances. t-Statistic in brackets. * Significantly different from zero at 90 % confidence, ** 95 % 
confidence, *** 99 % confidence. N = Number of countries, T = Number of years, N x T: number of observations. Data sources: European Commission (2015a) 
for Economic growth, Inflation, NULC, RULC, and Unemployment rate. Visser (2015) for Bargaining Coverage, Change, and Structure.  
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TABLE 3 
The effects of institutional change in the level of collective bargaining on unit labour costs 
 Nominal unit labour costs (NULC)     Real unit labour costs (RULC) 
 All  
changes 
 Lower 
level 
Higher 
level 
 All 
changes 
 Lower 
level 
Higher 
level 
 Distributed Lag Effects SoC  SoC SoC  SoC  SoC SoC 
 Lag (t) Lag (t-1) Lag(t-2) Lag (t-3) Lag (t-4) Lag (t-5) (t to t-5)  (t to t-5) (t to t-5)  (t to t-5)  (t to t-5) (t to t-5) 
Change+ 0.1382*** 0.0028 -0.0018 0.7685*** -0.2064** -0.0003 0.7010**  0.7014** 0.7018**  0.3404***  0.3420*** 0.3393*** 
(3.3824) (0.1681) (-0.0569) (12.2937) (-2.1857) (-0.0021) (2.2106)  (2.2069) (2.2123)  ( 2.7654)  (2.7805) (2.7595) 
Structure+ 0.0539 0.0699*** 0.0386 0.0441 0.0414 0.0611 0.3089***  0.3093*** 0.3096***   0.4283***  0.4293*** 0.4261*** 
(1.3503) (3.8615) (1.2069) (0.7270) (0.4549) (0.5009) (3.6120)  (3.6114) (3.6158)  (3.8204)  (3.8309) (3.8048) 
Bargaining 
coverage 
0.0369 0.0524*** 0.0398 0.0587 0.0549 0.0187 0.2615***  0.2612*** 0.2614***  0.2077**   0.2154**  0.2073** 
(0.8939) (2.9957) (1.3066) (0.9827) (0.6056) (0.1536)  (2.6596)  (2.6530) (2.6645)  (2.1296)  ( 2.2090) (2.1249) 
Economic 
growth 
0.0369 0.0854*** 0.1009*** 0.0473 0.0735 0.0370 0.3811  0.3804 0.3803   0.1437*   0.1476*  0.1416* 
(0.9712) (4.7887) (3.5317) (0.8722) (0.8987) (0.3373) (1.1690)  (1.1683) (1.1800)  (1.7280)  (1.7800)  (1.7053) 
Inflation 0.0752* 0.0695*** 0.0660** 0.0670 0.0690 0.1680 0.5146  0.5161 0.5171    0.3322***  0.3346*** 0.3309*** 
(1.8738) (4.2389) (2.2105) (1.1352) (0.7696) (1.3933) (1.1015)  (1.1000) (1.1039)  (2.7319)  (2.7526) (2.7238) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.1454*** 0.0911*** 0.0668*** 0.0834* 0.0413 -0.0086 0.4195  0.4191 0.4196  0.0149  0.0161  0.0131 
(3.7118) (5.1065) (2.8450) (1.7632) (0.5640) (-0.0857) (0.7001)   (0.7028) (0.7066)  (0.2210)  ( 0.2404) (0.1954) 
N x T:       801  801 801  801  801 801 
S.E.regression:       0.0671  0.0671 0.0671  0.0239  0.0239 0.0239 
Note: + Variables structure and change refer to the level of collective bargaining. Higher level considers only changes towards institutional structures at a higher 
level (centralization); Lower level considers changes towards lower levels (decentralization); All changes considers both directions of change. SoC = Sum of the 
distributed lag Coefficients. In all specifications a full set of period and country fixed effects dummies is included. Panel Generalized Method of Moments. First 
difference transformation. Panel corrected covariances. t-Statistic in brackets. * Significantly different from zero at 90 % confidence, ** 95 % confidence, *** 99 
% confidence. N x T: number of observations. For information about data sources, see notes in Table 2. 
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TABLE 4 
The effects of institutional stability in the coordination of collective bargaining on unit labour 
costs 
  Nominal unit labour costs (NULC)  Real unit labour costs (RULC) 
  SoC (t to t-5) SoC (t to t-5)  SoC (t to t-5) SoC (t to t-5) 
Shadow of the past  2 years 
Instability (t+2) 
4 years 
Instability (t+4) 
 2 years 
Instability (t+2) 
4 years 
Instability (t+4) 
Instability  1.0713*** 0.5815**  0.2766** 0.1565 
  (3.8618) (2.2135)  (2.2686) (1.3088) 
Structure  0.2426 0.5299*  0.3182*** 0.2697** 
  (0.9371) (1.9045)  (2.7158) (2.3405) 
Bargaining coverage  0.9277*** 0.1715  0.4144*** 0.2454** 
  (3.4942) (0.6682)  (3.9355) (2.2346) 
Economic growth  0.6229** 0.8249***  0.2112** 0.3139*** 
  ( 2.5116) (3.2876)  (2.4140) (3.3599) 
Inflation  0.5837** 1.0256***  0.3245*** 0.2306* 
  ( 2.1084) (3.6548)  ( 2.7071) (1.9340) 
Unemployment rate  0.1555 0.4955  0.1335 0.0860 
  (0.7770) ( 2.3785)  (2.0043) (1.2589) 
N x T:  774 746  774 746 
S.E.regression:  0.0674 0.0684  0.0241 0.0241 
Note: + Variables structure and instability refer to the coordination of collective bargaining. See Figure 
2 for details on instability variables. Estimations are based on a distributed lag model analogous to the 
results in Tables 2 and 3. For reasons of space only SoC (= Sum of the distributed lag Coefficients) are 
reported. In all specifications a full set of period and country fixed effects dummies is included. Panel 
Generalized Method of Moments. First difference transformation. Panel corrected covariances. t-
Statistic in brackets. * Significantly different from zero at 90 % confidence, ** 95 % confidence, *** 
99 % confidence. N x T: number of observations. For information about data sources, see notes in 
Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
